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RECENT CASES
BANKRUPTCY-ACTS OF BANKRUPTCY-PETITION FOR
DISSOLUTION UNDER STATE STATUTE
The insolvent corporation filed a certificate of dissolution pursuant
to Section 105 of the New York Stock Corporation Law, which re-
quires the directors of the petitioning corporation to wind up the
business and distribute the assets.' Creditors of the insolvent corpora-
tion brought an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding alleging that the
petition for dissolution was an act of bankruptcy under Section
3 (a) (5) of the Bankruptcy Act, which provides that it is an act of
bankruptcy if a person ". . . while insolvent or unable to pay his
debts as they mature, procured, permitted, or suffered voluntarily or
involuntarily the appointment of a receiver or trustee to take charge
of his property .... ,,2 The insolvent corporation opposed the adjudi-
cation on the grounds that the filing of a certificate of dissolution was
not an "appointment" under Section 3(a) (5) and merely continued
and expanded the fiduciary duties of the directors of the corporation.
The Referee ordered the adjudication. On petition for review, held,
Referee's report confirmed. The filing of a certificate of dissolution
by an insolvent corporation is an act of bankruptcy because it results
in the appointment of the directors as trustees to liquidate the
corporation. In re Bonnie Classics, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 646 (S.D.N.Y.
1953).
The 1903 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act provided that if the
receivership proceedings were voluntary, the application for a re-
ceiver or trustee while insolvent constituted an act of bankruptcy.3
On the other hand, if the receivership proceedings were involuntary,
the receiver or trustee had to be put in charge of the debtor's property
1. "[S]uch corporation by its board of directors shall proceed to adjust
and wind up its business and affairs with power to carry out its contracts
and to sell the assets ... and to apply the same in discharge of its liabilities
and obligations and . . . to distribute the remainder of its assets among its
stockholders." N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 105.
2. 30 STAT. 546 (1898), as amended, 66 STAT. 421 (1952), 11 U.S.C.A. §
21(a) (5) (Supp. 1953).
3. 30 STAT. 546 (1898), as amended, 32 STAT. 797 (1903), 11 U.S.C.A. §
21(a) (4) (1927). It is pertinent to note that the action of the insolvent
corporation in the instant case would clearly be an act of bankruptcy under
the 1903 amendment since the mere application for a receiver while insolvent
was sufficient. See, e.g., Haubtman & Loeb Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co., 13
F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1926); In re Detroit Transp. Truck Co., 276 Fed. 757 (E.D.
Mich. 1921); In re Rankin, 210 Fed. 529 (N.D. Ohio 1913), aff'd sub nom.
Hill v. Western Electric Co., 214 Fed. 243 (6th Cir. 1914).
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because of insolvency in order to constitute an act of bankruptcy.4
The 1926 amendment eliminated the distinction between voluntary
and involuntary receivership proceedings, and merely required that
a receiver or trustee be "appointed" or "put in charge" while in-
solvent. 5 The Chandler Act of 1938 sought to abolish any distinction
between "appointed" and "put in charge"8 by providing that an act
of bankruptcy is committed when the insolvent procures, suffers,
or permits the appointment of a receiver or trustee to take charge
of his property
The present Section 3(a) (5) provides that the appointment of
either a "receiver" or a "trustee" to take charge of the insolvent's
property is an act of bankruptcy." The technical title of the officer
or agent appointed to liquidate the insolvent debtor's estate has
not been of significance to the courts.9 However, to constitute an
act of bankruptcy the receivership must be general in that the
receiver or trustee appointed is to liquidate all the assets of the
debtor, not merely a portion of the insolvent's estate.10 An act of
4. 30 STAT. 546 (1898), as amended, 32 STAT. 797 (1903), 11 U.S.C.A. §
21(a) (4) (1927). This amendment was incorporated within § 3(a) (4) which
also provided that it was an act of bankruptcy to make a general assignment
for the benefit of creditors. Prior to the 1903 amendment the weight of
authority was that the appointment of a receiver or trustee was not a general
assignment for the benefit of creditors. In re Burrell, 123 Fed. 414 (2d Cir.
1903); Vaccaro v. Security Bank of Memphis, 103 Fed. 436 (6th Cir. 1900);
In re Empire Metallic Bedstead Co., 98 Fed. 981 (2d Cir. 1899), 14 HAV. L.
REV. 69 (1900); In re Gilbert, 112 Fed. 951 (D. Ore. 1902); In re Harper &
Bros., 100 Fed. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1900); In re Baker-Ricketson Co., 97 Fed. 489
(D. Mass. 1899). The 1903 amendment eliminated the appointment of a
receiver or trustee as a method of avoiding bankruptcy. 1 COLLIE, BANK-
RUPTCY § 3.501 (14th ed. 1940); 1 LOVELAND, BANKRUPTCY § 153 (4th ed. 1912);
1 REMINGTON, BAuNKRUPTCY § 156 (5th ed. 1950).
5. 30 STAT. 546 (1898), as amended, 44 STAT. 662 (1926); Colin, An Analysis
of the 1926 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, 26 COL. L. REV. 789, 792
(1926). For a criticism of the wording of this amendment, see McLaughlin,
Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 HARv. L. REv. 341, 368 (1927).
6. 20 STAT. 546 (1898), as amended, 66 STAT. 421 (1952), 11 U.S.C.A. §
21(a) (5) (Supp. 1953).
7. Prior to the 1926 amendment it was held that "put in charge" was
tantamount to the order of appointment by the court. In re Perry Aldrich
Co., 165 Fed. 249, 253 (D. Mass. 1908). But in 1928 it was held that a court
order of appointment of a receiver which required the receiver to give bond
was not an "appointment" under the Bankruptcy Act when the receiver re-
fused to give bond. In re Ago Const. Co., 26 F.2d 257 (M.D.N.C. 1928). For
the reasons behind the amendments to the Act of 1898, see 1 COLLIER, BANK-
RUPTCY § 3.501 (14th ed. 1940); 1 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 156 (5th ed. 1950).
8. 20 STAT. 546 (1898), as amended, 66 STAT. 421 (1952), 11 U.S.C.A. §
21(a) (5) (Supp. 1953).
9. Haubtman & Loeb Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co., 13 F.2d 335 (5th Cir.
1926). "An application for the appointment of judicial liquidators, under the
Louisiana statute, is in legal effect the same as an application for the appoint-
ment of a receiver or trustee ... because the powers and duties conferred
are the same. . . ." Id. at 336. Cf. In re International Coal Mining Co., 143 Fed.
665, 667 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd sub nom. Cresson & Clearfield Coal & Coke Co. v.
Stauffer, 148 Fed. 981 (3d Cir. 1906). See also NADLER, BANKRUPTCY § 461
(1948); 1 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 160 (5th ed. 1950).
10. See Elfast v. Lamb, 111 F.2d 434, 436 (2d Cir. 1940), 54 HAnv. L. REV.
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bankruptcy is committed by the appointment of a receiver or trustee,
either temporary or permanent,1 through court proceedings' 2 or
by agreehment of the parties.
Although the directors of a corporation bear a fiduciary relation-
ship to the corporation and its stockholders, 4 they are not trustees
in the strict sense.' 5 But in the instant case the New York Stock
Corporation Law refers to the directors as "trustees,"'16 the legal
title to the corporate property vests in the directors upon dissolution'
7
and the New York courts characterize the directors as "trustees."' s
Even if upon dissolution the directors continued in their previous
fiduciary relationship, the filing of the certificate of dissolution
created significant changes in their powers and duties. The directors,
in addition to their fiduciary duties, were empowered to take charge
of the corporate property, wind up the business, sell the corporate
assets and extinguish the corporation's obligations.
The specific act of bankruptcy charged in the instant case was
the act of the insolvent corporation in procuring the appointment
132; Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. E. T. Sheftall & Co., 53 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1931);
In re Turner, 51 F. Supp. 740, 743 (W.D. Ky. 1943); NADLER, BANKRUPTCY §
460 (1948). Section 105 of the New York Stock Corporation Law would seem to
meet this requirement. "The purpose of the statute was to provide for a
pro rata distribution of the corporation's property. . . ." Steinhardt Import
Corporation v. Levy, 174 Misc. 184, 20 N.Y.S.2d 360, 361 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
11. In re Luxor Cab Mfg. Corp., 25 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1928); Blue Mountain
Iron & Steel Co. v. Portner, 131 Fed. 57, 61 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 195 U.S.
636 (1904); In re Hewitt Grocery Co., 33 F. Supp. 493, 495 (D. Conn. 1940); In
re Kennedy Tailoring Co., 175 Fed. 871, 873 (E.D. Tenn. 1909).
12. Haubtman & Loeb Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co., 13 F.2d 335 (5th Cir.
1926); Beatty v. Andersen Coal Mining Co., 150 Fed. 293 (1st Cir. 1906);
In re Wenatchee Heights Orchard Co., 204 Fed. 674 (W.D. Wash. 1913); In re
Electric Supply Co., 175 Fed. 612 (S.D. Ga. 1909); In re Pickens Mfg. Co.,
158 Fed. 894 (N.D. Ga. 1908). "
13. In re R. V. Smith Co., 38 F. Supp. 57 (W.D. Okla. 1941); In re C. H.
Bennett Shoe Co., 140 Fed. 687 (D. Conn. 1905); In re Hercules Atkin Co.,
133 Fed. 813 (E.D. Pa. 1904).
14. Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148, 151
(1919); Baker v. Cohn, 42 N.Y.S.2d 159, 166 (Sup. Ct. 1942), ai'd, 292 N.Y.
570, 54 N.E.2d 689 (1944).
15. Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N.Y. 157, 61 N.E. 163, 164, 55 L.R.A. 751, 85
Am. St. Rep. 667 (1901); Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum & Transport
Co., 263 App. Div. 97, 31 N.Y.S.2d 934, 959 (1st Dep't 1941), aifd, 293 N.Y.
281, 56 N.E.2d 705 (1944); Wallace v. Lincoln Say. Bank, 89 Tenn. 630, 649,
15 S.W. 448, 453, 24 Am. St. Rep. 625 (1891); 3 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPOR-
ATIONS § 838 (1947); 4 POMEROY, EQurry JURISPRUDENCE § § 1089, 1090 (5th ed.
1941).
16. "The . . . directors, as trustees, . . . may continue to be sued in the
corporate name." N.Y. SToCK CoRn. LAw § 105(12).
17. Steinhardt Import Corp. v. Levy, 174 Misc. 184, 20 N.Y.S.2d 360, 361
(Sup. Ct. 1940). But legal title does not have to pass to the trustees under §
3 (a) (5) of the Bankruptcy Act. In re R. V. Smith Co., 38 F. Supp. 57, 62 (W.D.
Okla. 1941).
18. Central Union Trust Co. of N.Y. v. American Ry. Traffic Co., 198 App.
Div. 303 190 N.Y. Supp. 674, 676 (2d Dep't 1921), aff'd, 233 N.Y. 531, 135 N.E.
905 (192); In re Friedman, 177 App. Div. 755, 164 N.Y. Supp. 892, 894 (1st
Dep't 1917); Bank of New York v. Kennedy, 183 Misc. 819, 54 N.Y.S.2d 122,
125 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Marine Trust Co. of Buffalo v. Tralles, 147 Misc. 426,
263 N.Y. Supp. 750, 753 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
1954]
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of a receiver or trustee to take charge of its assets.19 The question
was whether the filing of the certificate of dissolution was tantamount
to the procuring of the appointment of a receiver or trustee.20 The
method of appointment of a receiver or trustee would seem to be
immaterial if one is designated to take charge of and liquidate the
insolvent's assets. 2' The court in the instant case stated, "The method
adopted to effect the transfer is immaterial. It is the end result that
counts. Any action . . .which effectively causes the transfer of his
property to another for final liquidation purposes appoints . . ." a
trustee to take charge under Section 3(a) (5).22 The criterion promul-
gated in the instant case would seem to be too restrictive. Section
3(a) (5) does not specifically require that the appointment of a
trustee be the result of action by the insolvent which would cause
an effective transfer of the insolvent's property. The instant case
holds that the filing of the certificate of dissolution caused an effective
transfer of the insolvent corporation's assets to the directors as
trustees and was therefore an "appointment" of the directors as
trustees and an act of bankruptcy under Section 3 (a) (5).23
As a result of the filing of the certificate of dissolution in the
instant case, the directors of the corporation were appointed to take
certain action with the corporate property.24 The determinative ques-
tion would then seem to be whether the purpose of the appointment
was to place some one in charge of the insolvent's property to
liquidate the insolvent's assets without considering the effectiveness
of the transfer.25 Applying either criterion, it would seem that the
19. 30 STAT. 546 (1898), as amended, 66 STAT. 421 (1952), 11 U.S.C.A. §
21(a) (5) (Supp. 1953); Sun-Lite Awning Corp. v. E. J. Conklin Aviation
Corp., 176 F.2d 344, 347 (4th Cir. 1949).
20. "The trial court found that 'On August 29, 1939, the Parrot Speed
Fastener Corporation was dissolved by filing a certificate of dissolution with
the Secretary of State.'" Speed Products Co. v. Tinnerman Products, Ind.,
179 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1949). "Any stock corporation ... may be dissolved
at any time by the filing . . . of a certificate.. ." of dissolution. N.Y. STOCK
CORP. LAW § 105. As a practical matter in determining whether an act of
bankruptcy has been committed within the required four months period,
the date of filing the certificate of dissolution would seem to be the most
suitable.
21. Cf. In re C. H. Bennett Shoe Co., 140 Fed. 687 (D. Conn. 1905) (directors
"put in charge" by written agreement); In re Hercules Atkin Co., Ltd., 133
Fed. 813, 815 (E.D. Pa. 1904) (trustee appointed by an election).
22. Instant case, 116 F. Supp. at 648.
23. Ibid.
24. Whether the appointment is made by statute, by the insolvent, or by
court order is immaterial since § 3 (a) (5) provides that the act of bankruptcy
is committed if the insolvent has "procured, permitted, or suffered ... the
appointment of a receiver.... ." See notes 12, 13 supra. Under the 1903 amend-
ment it was held that "to procure" the filing of a petition for a state receiver
is tantamount to "applying" for a receiver. In re Bucyrus Road Machinery Co.,
10 F.2d 333, 334 (6th Cir. 1926).
25. Even under the 1926 amendment there was doubt whether there had to
be an effective transfer to constitute an act of bankruptcy. In Walker v.
Morgan & Bird Gravel Co., 20 F.2d 547, 548 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S.
[ VOL. 7
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insolvent corporation in the instant case, by filing the certificate
of dissolution, procured, permitted, or suffered the appointment of
a trustee under Section 3(a) (5) of the Bankruptcy Act.
CORPORATIONS-STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUITS-
EQUITABLE STOCKHOLDER'S RIGHTS ,UNDER
SECURITY STATUTE
Plaintiff stockholder instituted a derivative action to recover dam-
ages from certain corporate officers for fraud, mismanagement and
waste. Defendants moved to require plaintiff to give security for
expenses under a Pennsylvania statute1 which authorized a corpora-
tion, in whose right a derivative action is brought by the holder of
less than five percent of the outstanding shares of its stock, to
require the plaintiff to give security for the reasonable expenses in-
curred by the corporation. Plaintiff was the beneficial owner of the
requisite five percent of the stock, but his stock was not registered in
the corporation's books. Held, plaintiff must either record his stock
or put up the required security. A stockholder maintaining a de-
rivative action, to avoid giving security for costs, must be the
registered owner. Murdock v. Follansbee Steel Corp., 114 F. Supp.
690 (W.D. Pa. 1953).
Although the term "stockholder" generally suggests one having
legal title to shares of stock registered in his name on the corporate
562 (1927), the court held that if a court has jurisdiction, the appointment
of a receiver is an act of bankruptcy even if the appointment was erroneous.
In In re Sedalia Farmers' Co-Op. Packing & Produce Co., 268 Fed. 898, 902
(W.D. Mo. 1919), 34 HARv. L. REv. 784 (1921), the court said, "That that court
may, therefore, have been without jurisdiction and that the appointment may
have been improvidently made, is beside the question." See note 7 supra. One
purpose of present § 3 (a) (5) was to eliminate the conflict whether to "put in
charge" was equivalent to an "appointment" by requiring only the appoint-
ment of trustee. 1 CO.LIER, B mxupTcy 474-75 (14th ed. 1940).
"The Act of 1938 speaks merely of the 'appointment of a receiver or
trustee to take charge of' the debtor's property. Thus it now seems that the
mere 'appointment' is sufficient to constitute the act of bankruptcy." 1 Id.
at 478.
1. "In any such suit instituted or maintained by holder or holders of less
than five per centum of the outstanding shares of any class of such corpora-
tion's stock or voting trust certificates, the corporation in whose right such
action is brought shall be entitled, at any stage of the proceedings, to require
plaintiff or plaintiffs to give security for the reasonable expenses, including
attorneys' fees, which may be incurred by it in connection with such suit,
and by the other parties defendant in connection therewith, for which it
may become liable pursuant to section three of this act, to which security
the corporation shall have recourse in such amount as the court having
jurisdiction shall determine upon the termination of such action. . . ." PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1322 (1953). See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,




books,2 the word may also denote simply the equitable owner of
shares not yet registered, such as the beneficiary of a stock trust
or the vendee under a contract to sell stock.3 The rights of the legal
owner and those of the beneficial owner may not always be identical
in regard to corporate affairs, but in some instances they will be
equal.4 The court in the instant case decided that the intention of
the security statute was not met unless plaintiff's stock appeared of
record. 5 This precise requirement was not particularized in the statute,
and no case has been found where the point has been ruled upon
by any court.
In those situations where the statute and corporate charter are
calculated to permit the corporation to maintain an efficient internal
organization, it may be required that the stockholder be one of
record. Thus, in most instances, only the record holder may vote in
a corporate election, 6 object to a corporation merger,7 participate
in the distribution of assets upon liquidation8 and receive stock divi-
dends. The stockholder is required to appear of record in these
instances in order to avoid the confusion which would otherwise
exist if, for the transacting of such corporate business, it were
necessary to determine the unrecorded ownership of stock. There
must be order and certainty and a definite source of information.
The court in the instant case interprets the security statute as
just such a law.
The statute in question, however, requires security not for the
purpose of determining stockholder identity, but rather to prevent
the so-called "strike suit" which is often instituted for a nuisance
purpose This security requirement is founded upon the realization
2. 18 C.J.S., Corporations § 475(b) (1939).
3. 13 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 5976 n.44 (1943).
4. "The word 'shareholder' in its ordinary and generally accepted meaning
... is sufficiently broad to include the equitable as well as the legal owner.
If the rulemakers had intended that a 'shareholder' be limited to one of
record, they could have readily so provided." HFG Co. v. Pioneer Pub. Co.,
162 F.2d 536, 540 (7th Cir. 1947).
5. See, Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in
New York, 32 CALIF. L. REv. 123 (1944). The author is bitterly opposed to
the security requirement law, and concludes that "[piresumably an equitable
owner ... would be barred unless he put up bond." Id. at 124 n.6.
6. "The general and best rule is that the person in whose name stock stands
on the books is entitled to vote it ... ." Morrill v. Little Falls Mfg. Co., 53
Minn. 371, 55 N.W. 547, 550 (1893).
7. Salt Dome Oil Corp. v. Schenck, 28 Del. Ch. 433, 41 A.2d 583 (1945).
This case is cited and quoted in the instant case as authority. But the court
states: "We are not concerned here with ... [a question relating] to the status
of an equitable owner of the stock, in a court of equity, in pursuit of an
equitable remedy." Id. at 586. This fully distinguishes it from the instant case.
8. 12 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 5506 (1932).
9. "For the so-called 'strike-suit' properly defined, is a suit brought not
with an intent of diligent and effective prosecution, but with the motive of
speedy, secret, private settlement for its nuisance value." House, Stockholders'
Suits and the Coudert-Mitchell Laws, 20 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 387 (1945).
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that a stockholder who owns five percent or more of a corporation's
assets likely will not be inclined to burden his corporation irresponsi-
bly with baseless law suits and legal expenses; but a shareholder
who owns a smaller financial interest might well bring a suit against
the best interests of the corporation.'0 The rigidity that is necessary
to identify the stockholder for voting, dividend, merger and similar
purposes is not needed where the equitable owner of stock is seeking
to protect the corporation's interest. The security statute is therefore
distinguishable from the rules generally requiring a registration of
the owner's stock. It is apparent that the beneficial owner of five
percent of the stock has as great a financial interest involved as a
record owner of a like number of shares. Thus, an equitable holder
is no more apt to bring a suit for nuisance purposes than is a
registered shareholder.
In Pennsylvania, as in many other jurisdictions, the security statute
imposes one of the two requirements for maintaining a derivative
suit. The other is that the plaintiff be a stockholder at the time of
the transaction of which he complains.'" This requirement also is
designed primarily to prevent nuisance suits.' 2 It is significant that
the weight of authority permits an equitable owner to maintain an
action under statutes requiring him to be a stockholder at the time
of the transaction;13 the statutory term "stockholder" is construed to
include an equitable owner.'
4
The equitable owner of stock has full and complete stockholder
rights under these statutes and charter- provisions which seek to
limit strike suits. It is submitted that, as the security statute is
primarily one to limit strike suits, the equitable owner should be
able to avoid giving security upon proof of ownership of five percert
of the corporation's stock.
10. See Fuller v. American Machine & Foundry Co., 97 F. Supp. 742
(S.D.N.Y. 1951); Gordon v. Elliman, 280 App. Div. 655, 116 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1st
Dep't 1952); Noel Associates, Inc. v. Merrill, 184 Misc. 75, 53 N.Y.S.2d 143
(Sup. Ct. 1944).
11. "In any suit brought to enforce a secondary right on the part of one
or more shareholders against any officer, or director, or former officer or
director of a corporation, domestic or foreign, because such corporation refuses
to enforce rights which may properly be asserted by it, the plaintiff . . .
must aver . . . that the plaintiff .. . was a stockholder at the time of the
transaction of which he complains, or that his stock devolved upon him by
operation of law from a person who was a stockholder at such time." PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1321 (1953).
12. Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 299, 60 A.2d 106 (1948).
13. Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 145 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1944);
Richardson v. Blue Grass Mining Co., 29 F. Supp. 658 (E.D. Ky. 1939).




Subpoenaed by the Senate Crime Investigating Committee, de-
fendant testified, without claiming his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, concerning certain crimes he had committed in the State of
Maryland. Rejecting defendant's contention that United States Crimi-
nal Code Section 34861 prohibited the use of the committee testimony
against him, the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction
based upon the committee testimony.2 On certiorari the State argued
(1) that the defendant "waived the statutory 'privilege' by testifying
'voluntarily' . . . (2) the Section should be construed so as to apply
to United States Courts only" and (3) "that Congress is without
constitutional power to bar the use of congressional committee testi-
mony in the state courts." Held, reversed. No language in the Act
conditions immunity upon the claim of privilege; the Act clearly
states the testimony shall not be used "in any court," and Congress
has the power to bind the State courts under the necessary and proper
clause of the First Amendment. Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179,
74 Sup. Ct. 442 (1954).
Congress in 1857 first enacted the immunity statute in question.3
Its primary purpose was to grant committee witnesses immunity from
prosecution in order to compel incriminating testimony despite the
privilege against self-incrimination. It was held in Counselman v.
Hitchcock,4 however, that Congress had failed in its purpose, inas-
much as the statute did not confer complete immunity. That is,
the statute prohibited only the use of the committee testimony
against the witness in a subsequent criminal proceeding, rather than
completely barring the prosecution of any offense disclosed by the
testimony. Stirred by the Counselman decision, Congress enacted an
Interstate Commerce Commission immunity statute, which provided
that "no person shall be prosecuted ... for or on account of any...
[offense disclosed to] said Commission." Interpreting the statute
to apply to both state and federal prosecution, the Court in Brown
v. Walker held this statute did provide the complete immunity lack-
ing in the Counselman case and all constitutional requirements against
1. "No testimony given by a witness before either House, or before any
committee of either House, or before any joint committee established by a
joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, shall be used
as evidence in any criminal proceeding against him in any court .... " 18
U.S.C.A. § 3486 (1951).
2. Adams v. State, 97 A:2d 281 (Md. 1953).
3. 11 STAT. 156 (1857).
4. 142 U.S. 547, 12 Sup. Ct. 195, 35 L. Ed. 1110 (1892).
5. 27 STAT. 443 (1893), 49 U.S.C.A. § 46 (1951).
6. 161 U.S. 591, 16 Sup. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed. 819 (1896). See United States
v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427-28, 63 Sup. Ct. 409, 87 L. Ed. 376 (1943).
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self-incrimination, therefore, had been met by this statute.7 The
proper method for a defendant to claim the immunity provided by
a statute is by a special plea in bar;8 but if the defendant does not
claim the immunity, the evidence may be used to convict him, as
the statute does not prohibit the defendant from waiving his
immunity.9
In both the Counselman and Brown cases the witness had claimed
his privilege against self-incrimination. The next question facing
the courts was whether or not it was necessary for the witness to
invoke his privilege against self-incrimination at the hearing before
the immunity statute was applicable. The lower federal courts were
in sharp conflict on this point. The courts holding it necessary to
plead the privilege reasoned that Congress intended the immunity
statute to be coterminous only with the Fifth Amendment.1°4 The
other courts relied on the plain words of the Act which did not
require the assertion." The majority state view requires the witness
to claim his privilege before the statute is applicable.12 The first
clear cut decision by the Supreme Court was in United States v.
Monia"3 wherein the Court in interpreting the Sherman Anti-trust
7. The court intimated, however, that even if the statute were not applicable
to state prosecution, it still would have met all constitutional requirements.
See Brown v. Walker 161 US. 591, 608, 16 Sup. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed. 819 (1896);
United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 149, 52 Sup. Ct. 63, 76 L. Ed. 210 (1931)
(full and complete immunity against prosecution by the government compell-
ing the witness to answer is equivalent to the protection furnished by the
Fifth Amendment).
8. Scribner v. State, 9 Okla. Crim. 465, 132 Pac. 933 (1913); State v. Sine,
91 W. Va. 608, 114 S.E. 150 (1922); see, Heike v. United States, 217 U.S.
423, 433, 30 Sup. Ct. 539, 54 L. Ed. 821 (1910).
9. Heike v. United States, 217 U.S. 423, 431, 30 Sup. Ct. 539, 54 L. Ed. 821
(1910) (statute does not provide immunity from prosecution, but only a
shield against successful prosecution). See also Burrell v. Montana, 194
U.S. 572, 24 Sup. Ct. 787, 48 L. Ed. 1122 (1904).
10. See Johnson v. United States, 5 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1925); Sherwin v.
United States, 297 Fed. 704 (5th Cir. 1924), ajFd, 268 U.S. 369 (1925); United
States v. Lay Fish Co., 13 F.2d 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1926); see United States v. Lee,
290 Fed. 517 (N.D. Tex. 1923); United States v. Elkton, 222 Fed. 428 (S.D.N.Y.
1915); United States v. Skinner, 218 Fed. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
11. United States v. American Meat Institute, 47 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ill.
1942), affd sub nom. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943); United
States v. Goldman, 28 F.2d 424 (D. Conn. 1928); United States v. Moore, 15
F.2d 593 (D. Ore. 1926); United States v. Pardue, 294 Fed. 543 (S.D. Tex.
1923).
12. State v. Burnett, 184 N.C. 783, 115 S.E. 57 (1922); Scribner v. State, 9
Okla. Crim. 465, 132 Pac. 933 (1913); Commonwealth v. Richardson, 229 Pa.
609, 79 Atl. 222 (1911); State v. Davidson, 242 Wis. 406, 8 N.W.2d 275 (1943);
State v. Grosnickle, 189 Wis. 17, 206 N.W. 895 (1926). Contra: State ex Tel.
Marshall v. Pettway, 121 Fla. 828, 164 So. 872 (1936); People v. Sharp, 107
N.Y. 427, 1 Am. St. Rep. 851 (1887); People v. Buffalo Gravel Corp., 195 N.Y.
Supp. 940 (Sup. Ct. 1922); Nelson v. State, 41 Ohio App. 174, 180 N.E. 84
(1931). See Note, 3 Wis. L. REv. 485 (1926) for a discussion of the necessity
of a witness claiming the privilege against self-incrimination before the im-
munity statute is applicable.
13. 317 U.S. 424, 63 Sup. Ct. 409, 87 L. Ed. 376 (1943). See Notes, 18 NoTRE




immunity statute 14 held it was not necessary to a claim the privilege
in order to retain the benefit of the immunity statute. The Court
noted that it was not until 1934 that Congress required in an im-
munity statute' 5 that the witness plead his privilege before the
statute was applicable, and that Congress had not so amended the
statute before the Court.
In light of the instant case it seems clear that a witness before a
congressional committee is given double protection; he can plead his
privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to testify, or he can
testify without claiming his privilege and be secure in the knowledge
that the statute16 prohibits the use of his testimony as evidence
against him in both the state and federal courts. The instant case
also clearly holds that Congress can regulate the use of evidence in
a state court when that is necessary to carry out the purposes of a
federal statute. Considering the strong dicta of Brown v. Walker and
the holding of the instant case, it seems safe to predict that Congress
can constitutionally enact a statute prohibiting prosecution in a state
court of any offense which is disclosed by the testimony of a witness
before a congressional committee.
1 7
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-GRAND JURY INDICTMENTS-
FAILURE OF JURORS TO HEAR ALL THE EVIDENCE
AS GROUNDS FOR SETTING ASIDE INDICTMENT.
Defendant, on arraignment, moved the court for permission to ex-
amine the record of attendance and the minutes of the grand jury for
the purpose of demonstrating that the required number of jurors
had not been present to hear the evidence presented against him.
The motion to inspect the minutes was denied, consistent with a pre-
established policy of the court, but the court itself examined the
minutes and found the contention of the defendant true in a substantial
degree. Held, indictment dismissed. People v. Brinkman, 126 N.Y.S.2d
495 (County Ct. 1953).
At common law the composition of a grand jury ranged from 12
14. 32 STAT. 904 (1903), 15 U.S.C.A. § 32 (1951), 49 U.S.C.A. § 47 (1951).
15. 48 STAT. 899 (1934), as amended, 63 STAT. 107 (1949), 15 U.S.C.A. §
78u(d) (1951); see 54 STAT. 853 (1940), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-9(d) (1951); 49
STAT. 831 (1935), as amended, 63 STAT. 107 (1949), 15 U.S.C.A. § 79r(e) (1951).
16. But see United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 335, 70 Sup. Ct. 724, 94
L. Ed. 884 (1950) (immunity not granted even though the literal language
of the act would cover the testimony, since to do so would be contrary to
the purposes of the statute).
17. It is clear that a state immunity statute cannot prohibit federal prose-
cution of a crime disclosed by the testimony of the witness. Feldman v.
United States, 322 U.S. 487, 64 Sup. Ct. 1082, 88 L. Ed. 1408 (1944).
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to 231 persons and the concurrence of at least 122 was required to
indict. Most states now fix, either by statute or constitutional pro-
vision, a maximum number,3 a minimum number required to concur
4
and, in many cases, a quorum without which no business may be trans-
acted.5 It is generally held that the death, absence or excusal of one
or more members does not- invalidate the indictment so long as the
prescribed minimum necessary for concurrence is present.6
Some states by statute,7 and others by judicial decision,8 provide that
grand juries may act only upon legal evidence or upon evidence "pro-
duced, sworn and examined."' Most, if not all, states, however,
require that grand jurors take an oath that they shall "inquire into"
offenses within the county, and 'true presentment make ... to the
best of ... [their] knowledge."'01
The instant case stands almost alone in its consideration of the
amount of such evidence which must be heard by the individual grand
jurors in order to concur in the indictment. The court held1 that,
implicit in the statutes providing a minimum number for concurrence1
2
and the presentment of an indictment only on such evidence as would
warrant a conviction,'13 there is the additional requirement that those
concurring should have heard all or substantially all the evidence.1
4
1. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 139 (1947); 23
AM. JUR., Grand Jury § 13 (1939).
2. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 139 (1947); 23
AM. Jur., Grand Jury § 16 (1939).
3. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 59-202 (1937); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 78, § 16 (1935);
MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 28.951 (1948); Miss. CODE ANN. § 1779 (1942). The fol-
lowing states have constitutional provisions: COLO. CONST. Art. II, § 23
(1876); Ky. CONST. § 248 (1891); LA. CONST. Art VII, § 42 (1921); Mo. CONST.
Art. II, § 28 (1875); N. M. CONST. Art. II, § 14 (1912); OKLA. CONST. Art. II,
§ 18 (1907); TEXAS CONST. Art. V, § 13 (1876); Wyo. CONST. Art. I, § 9 (1889).
4. ALA. CODE tit. 30, § 89 (1940); Axmz CODE ANN. § 44-626 (1939); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 11600 (Williams 1934); MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 28.963 (1948);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 2441 (1942).
5. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 224; TEXAS CONST. Art. V, § 13 (1876).
6. Jones v. United States, 162 Fed. 417 (9th Cir. 1908) (failure to notify
two jurors of meeting); In re Meckley, 50 F. Supp. 274 (M.D. Pa. 1943); People
v. Simmons, 119 Cal. 1, 50 Pac. 844 (1897) (incompetency); People v. Hunter,
54 Cal. 65 (1879) (death); State v. Cooley, 72 Minn. 476, 75 N.W. 729 (1898);
State v. Coulter, 104 Miss. 764, 61 So. 706 (1913) (absence of foreman); State
v. Connors, 233 Mo. 348, 135 S.W. 444 (1911); State v. Garrison, 130 N.J.L.
350, 33 A.2d 113 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
7. AxIz. CODE ANN. § 44-613 (1939); ARK. STAT. § 43-918 (1947) CAL. PENAL
CODE § 919 (1949); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 628.59 (West 1947); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-522 (1941); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 256.
8. See Noll v. Dailey, 72 W. Va. 520, 79 S.E. 688, 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1207,
1209 (1913).
9. See e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 771.17 (1950); MINN. CODE ANN. § 629.59
(West 1947).
10. RESTATEMENT, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 126 (1931).
11. Instant case, 126 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
12. N.Y. CODE CRnw. PROC. § 256.
13. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 258. See RESTATEMENT, CODE OF CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE § 140 (1931).
14. Instant case, 126 N.Y.S.2d at 504.
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An important function of the grand jury is "to stand between the
prosecutor and the accused, and to determine whether the charge
was founded upon credible testimony .... ,15 The citizen should be
protected from the "disgrace of arrest and accusation and the anxiety
and expense of trial under an indictment illegally found." 6 If absen-
teeism and rubber stamp methods are condoned by the courts or if
evidence of those practices is inaccessible 7 to the defendant on motion
to quash, then the usefulness of the grand jury is vitiated.
On the other hand, it is argued that an indictment is only an
accusation 8 and that the harm done the defendant does not counter-
balance the resulting inconvenience of a second grand jury investi-
gation.19 This position also finds support in a construction of the
statutes. Since evidence before the grand jury is aimed at a prima
facie establishment of guilt, the failure of jurors to hear all the
evidence weakens the case against the accused. "If what the absentees
hear is enough to satisfy them, there would seem to be no reason
why they should not vote."20 It would seem also that the provision
for a maximum number, a lesser quorum and a minimum for con-
currence presupposes.the absence of some of the voting grand jurors.2'
Even if the result in the instant case were considered desirable,
there is the very difficult procedural problem of how to raise the
question22 and then how to prove it.23 Most states adhere to the rule
of secrecy 24 and it has been held that the regularity of grand jury
proceedings is presumed when the indictment is signed by the requi-
site number of jurors; 25 nor may a grand juror testify that the indict-
ment did not receive this number.26 It is also the majority rule that
courts may not inquire into the sufficiency of evidence before a grand
jury.27 New York, however, is in the minority and holds that the
defendant has a constitutional right to have an indictment based on
15. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 20 Sup. Ct .370, 50 L. Ed. 652 (1906).
16. Instant case, 126 N.Y.S.2d at 504. See ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 144-46 (1947).
17. See note 22 supra.
18. Cf., Wortham v. State, 82 Ark. 321, 101 S.W. 757 (1907).
19. United States ex rel. McCann v. Thompson, 144 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 1944).
20. Id. at 607.
21. Ibid.
22. Unless specifically provided by statute, the general rule is that minutes
or notes of grand jury proceedings are not available to the defendant. Some
do permit this in the discretion of the court. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 169 (1947).
23. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 167 (1947); Note,
27 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 319 (1947).
24. Nash v. State, 79 Ark. 120, 95 S.W. 147 (1906); Nash v. State, 73 Ark.
399, 84 S.W. 497 (1904).
25. Nash v. State, 79 Ark. 120, 95 S.W. 147 (1906); Gitchell v. People, 146
Ill. 175, 33 N.E. 757 (1893); State v. Baker, 20 Mo. 338 (1855).
26. AM. JUR., Indictments and Informations § 170 (1940). See Notes, 24
A.L.R. 1432 (1923), 31 A.L.R. 1479 (1924), 51 A.L.R. 573 (1927).
27. People v. Sexton, 187 N.Y. 495, 511, 80 N.E. 396, 401-02 (1907).
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illegal or insufficient evidence quashed. Under these rulings, the
result in the instant case seems justified and, in fact, inevitable.
Although it would not be an unreasonable construction of their
statutes for other states to follow the rule of the instant case, in
view of the secrecy accorded grand jury proceedings in most states,
such a construction seems unlikely..
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-TORTS-ACTION BY WIFE AGAINST
HUSBAND FOR PERSONAL INJURIES
Plaintiff, a married woman, brought an action against defendant,
her husband, for injuries resulting from defendant's alleged negligent
operation of a motor vehicle in which plaintiff was riding. The trial
court sustained a demurrer to the complaint. Held, reversed. A mar-
ried woman may maintain a personal injury action against her
husband for negligence. Combs v. Combs, 262 S.W.2d 821 (Ky. 1953).'
At common law one spouse could not maintain a tort action against
the other.2 The reasons given for the prohibition were the public
policy against actions which tended to disturb domestic tranquility,
and the legal identity of the parties which resulted in a futile circuity
of action.8 By the eighteenth century the harsh common-law rule
had been tempered somewhat by the recognition of the wife's separate
estate in equity.4 Then, during the nineteenth century, the rights of
married women were greatly expanded by the passage of the Married
Women's Acts, which were intended to secure a separate legal estate
to married women.5 The great variety of wording and interpretation
of these statutes has caused much confusion as to their effect. 6
After the passage of these laws it was generally held that a married
woman might bring action in her own name against third persons
upon any cause of action whatever.7 It was also generally held that
in order to effectuate the manifest legislative purpose of securing
her separate property a married woman might sue 'her husband in
such actions as ejectment, replevin, conversion and detention of
chattels, trespass to land, waste and unlawful detainer.8 However,
1. The instant case is an extension of, and adopts the reasoning of Brown
v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953), which held that a woman's cause of
action in tort was not extinguished by subsequent marriage to the defendant.
2. MADDEN, PERSONS AND DoMEsTIc RELATIONS 220 (1931); 3 VERNIER,
A1ERicAN F~my LAWS 268 (1935).
3. See Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Ky. 1953); 41 C.J.S., Husband
and Wife § 396 (1944).
4. See Note, 13 OHo ST. L.J. 90 (1952).
5. MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 220-25 (1931).
6. See generally 27 Am. JuR., Husband and Wife §§ 589-637 (1940); 41
C.J.S., Husband and Wife § 396 (1944).
7. 41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife § 389 et seq. (1944).
8. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 255 Ala. 284, 51 So.2d 13 (1951) (conversion);
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many jurisdictions, supported by a decision of the Supreme Court,9
still refused to allow one spouse to sue the other spouse for a
personal tort. This is the majority view today.'0 The usually advanced
reasons for denying the action are the public policy against disturbing
domestic tranquility, the possibility of raids on insurance companies,
the possibility of trivial actions for minor annoyances, the rule that
statutes in derogation of common law should be strictly construed
and the notion that the divorce and criminal courts offer sufficient
remedies to married women against their husbands."
On the other hand, a substantial and growing minority of juris-
dictions do permit married women to maintain personal tort actions
against their husbands.' 2 Moreover, some of those courts which sub-
scribe to the majority view have allowed a wife to recover in certain
situations, as where her cause of action arose before marriage, 13 or
where the parties became separated before the cause of action arose.
14
Hall v. Hall, 193 Tenn. 74, 241 S.W.2d 919 (1951) (unlawful detainer); 27
Amu. JuR., Husband and Wife § 599 (1940); MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC
RELATIONS 222 (1931); see Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Ky. 1953).
9. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 31 Sup. Ct. 111, 54 L. Ed. 1180
(1910). See Note, 30 Cm KENT REV. 343 (1952). But cf. Steele v. Steele, 65
F. Supp. 329 (D.D.C. 1946), in which it was held that a woman might main-
tain an action against her former husband for an assault committed after
an absolute divorce was granted but before the sixty day interim period had
elapsed.
10. Paulus v. Bauder, 106 Cal. App.2d 589, 235 P.2d 432 (1951) (wife has
no cause of action for injuries sustained after interlocutory decree but before
final decree); Corren v. Corren, 47 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1950); Wright v. Wright,
85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952); Sink v. Sink, 172 Kan. 217, 239 P.2d
933 (1952); Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 78 N.E.2d 637 (1948) (no cause
of action for a tort committed during a marriage later annuled); Wolfer v.
Oehlers, 8 N.J. Super. 434, 73 A.2d 95 (L. 1950); Tanno v. Eby, 78 Ohio App.
21, 68 N.E.2d 813 (1946) (ante-nuptial cause of action for personal injuries
extinguished by marriage to defendant); Raines v. Mercer, 165 Tenn. 415, 55
S.W.2d 263 (1932); Furey v. Furey, 193 Va. 727, 71 S.E.2d 191 (1952); Mc-
Kinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d 940 (1943); see Addison v. Em-
ployers Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 64 So.2d 484 (La. App. 1953); American Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Molling, 57 N.W.2d 847 (Minn. 1953). See Notes, 160 A.L.R. 1406
(1946), 89 A.L.R. 118 (1934).
In England there exists an unusual situation in which the wife may
recover for an ante-nuptial tort of the husband. Curtis v. Wilcox, [1948]
2 K.B. 474 (C.A.). But the husband is not allowed to recover for an ante-
nuptial tort committed upon him by his wife. Baylis v. Blackwell, [1952]
1 K.B. 154 (1951).
11. See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 31 Sup. Ct. 111, 54 L. Ed.
1180 (1910); McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d 940 (1943).
12. Bennett v. Bennett, 224 Ala. 335, 140 So. 378 (1932); Katzenberg v.
Katzenberg, 183 Ark. 626, 37 S.W.2d 696 (1931); Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn.
42, 89 Atl. 889 (1914) (assault and battery and false imprisonment); Brandt
v. Keller, 413 fll. 503, 109 N.E.2d 729 (1952); Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d
480 (Ky. 1953); Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938);
Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S.C. 129, 166 S.E. 101 (1932); Wait v. Pierce. 191 Wis.
228, 209 N.W. 475, 48 A.L.R. 276 (1926); see Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D.
53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941). A New York statute expressly allows the action.
NEW YORx DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW § 57.
13. Carver v. Ferguson, 254 P.2d 44 (Cal. App. 1953); Curtis v. Wilcox,
[1948] 2 K.B. 474 (C.A.).
14. Lorang v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949) (false imprisonment);
cf. Steele v. Steele, supra note 9.
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Also in this group of cases are those in which a wife was allowed to
recover from the husband's employer for a tort committed by the
husband within the scope of his employment,15 and where the wife
was allowed to recover from a partnership' 6 or voluntary association' 7
of which the husband was a member, although she could not recover
from him personally.
Many courts and text-writers have given persuasive reasons for
the adoption of the minority view:' the majority rule is vestigial
in character and embodies no tenable policy of morals or of social
welfare; as this type of liability constitutes an additional risk which
may be insured against, it would ultimately redound to the benefit
of insurers; safeguards against trivial actions can be formulated;
the precise wording of many statutes gives the wife a right to sue
in all cases as if she were unmarried; the divorce and criminal courts
do not afford a sufficient remedy for personal torts. In adopting this
rationale, the instant case would seem to be in line with modern
social policy and in accord with the policy of the Married Women's
Acts.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION-SCOPE OF FEDERAL COMMON
LAW-CHARACTERIZATION OF FOREIGN STATUTE
FOR PURPOSE OF APPLYING FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION
Pursuant to an Arkansas statute,' plaintiff, an Arkansas creditor
of an imperfectly formed Arkansas corporation, brought suit in the
federal court for the western district of Tennessee against two
Tennessee incorporators to hold them liable as partners2 for a
corporate debt. The district court, having diversity jurisdiction,
imposed liability on the theory that the full faith and credit clause
of the Federal Constitution required the enforcement of the Arkansas
statute since that statute was not penal in the international sense;3
15. Jones v. Kinney, 113 F. Supp. 923 (W.D. Mo. 1953); Tallios v. Tallios,
345 Ill. App. 342, 103 N.E.2d 507 (1952); Broom v. Morgan, [1952] 2 All
E.R. 1007 (Q.B.).
16. Tobin v. Hoffman, 96 A.2d 597 (Md. 1953). Contra: Fagg v. Benton
Motor Co., 193 Tenn. 562, 246 S.W.2d 978 (1952).
17. Damm v. Elyria Lodge, etc., 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E.2d 337 (1952).
18. See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 619, 31 Sup. Ct. 111, 54 L. Ed.
1180 (1910) (dissenting opinion); McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135
P.2d 940, 956 (1943) (dissenting opinion); also see Brown v. Gossner, 262
S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953); Notes, 30 CHI-KENT REV. 343 (1952), 13 OHIO ST. L.J.
90 (1952).
1. ARK. STAT. ANx. § 64-103 (1947).
2. Whitaker v. Mitchell Mfg. Co., 219 Ark. 779, 244 S.W.2d 965 (1952).
3. "The question whether a statute of one State, which in some aspects
may be called penal, is a penal law in the international sense, so that it
19541
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the court of appeals affirmed.4 Shortly thereafter the Tennessee
Supreme Court, in a separate case involving the same defendants
and issues, held that the Arkansas statute was penal and therefore
the full faith and credit clause did not require its enforcement by
Tennessee.5 Thereupon a petition for rehearing was filed in the
original case in the court of appeals. Held, petition granted and the
case reversed. One of the three judges joined the previous dissenting
judge to hold that the Erie doctrine required the federal courts in
Tennessee to apply that state's characterization of the Arkansas
statute. Doggrell v. Southern Box Co., 208 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1953).
It has often been said that state courts will follow the decisions
of federal courts on questions of federal law and that federal courts
will follow the decisions of the courts of the state in which they sit
on questions of that state's law whether jurisdiction is based upon
diversity of citizenship or on a federal question. The instant case
clearly presents a federal issue, as the full faith and credit clause
of the Constitution protects the plaintiff's right to a cause of action
in Tennessee if the Arkansas statute upon which it is based is not
penal. Whether the characterization of that statute as penal or
remedial is to be made in accordance with state law or in accord-
ance with general law as determined by the federal courts is the
narrow issue in the case. That the Erie doctrine does not require the
federal courts to apply state law to federal issues or those incident
thereto8 is exemplified by numerous cases which involve either a
right created by a federal statute or, as in the instant case, a right
protected by the federal Constitution 9 As an illustration, the federal
cannot be enforced in the courts of another State, depends upon the question
whether its purpose is to punish an offense against the public justice of the
State, or to afford a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act."
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673-74, 13 Sup. Ct. 224, 36 L. Ed. 1123
(1892).
4. Doggrell v. Great Southern Box Co., 206 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1953).
5. Paper Products Co. v. Doggrell, 261 S.W.2d 127 (Tenn. 1953), 7 VAND, L.
Rv. 281 (1954).
6. Stated without limitations, the doctrine is that, to secure uniformity
of the results of litigation within a state, federal courts apply the substantive
common law of the state.
7. See Note, 59 IHARv. L. REV. 966, 974-76 (1946). Also see BuNN, JtRnISDIC-
TION AND PRAcTIca OE THE CouRTs or THE UNITED STATES 268-76 (5th ed. 1949)
where the theme is that a court, whether state or federal, and regardless of
the basis of jurisdiction, applies state law if the litigant asserts state-created
rights and applies federal law if the litigant's rights are federal.
8. See Note, 140 A.L.R. 717, 718 (1942); 35 C.J.S., Federal Courts §§ 170,
186 (1943).
9. See, e.g., Higginbotham v. Baton Rouge, 306 U.S. 535, 59 Sup. Ct. 705,
83 L. Ed. 968 (1939); Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 59 Sup. Ct. 155, 83 L. Ed. 119
(1938); George S. Colton Electric Web Co. v. United States, 116 F.2d 202 (1st
Cir. 1940); Faulkner v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 987 (1st Cir. 1940); Florida
Power and Light Co. v. Miami, 98 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1938). But see Dysart
v. United States, 95 F.2d 652 (8th Cir. 1938). For a comprehensive annotation
concerning the duty imposed on the federal courts by the Erie doctrine to
follow state law, see 140 A.L.R. 717 (1942).
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courts, for the purpose of determining the existence of a contract,
are ordinarily obliged to apply state law in an action on a contract.
Nevertheless, in a case in which effect must be given the impairment
of contract clause of the Federal Constitution, the federal courts
determine by general law, as distinguished from the law of the
forum, whether there is in fact a contract.V 0 Since, in the instant
case, the full faith and credit clause requires that, unless it be penal,
the Arkansas statute be effectuated, the characterization of the
statute, being essential to the determination of a constitutional ques-
tion, raises a federal issue. The characterization, therefore, should be
made in accordance with federal law rather than that of the forum.
The Kaxon case" is clearly distinguishable from the case under
consideration and is not controlling. There the plaintiff's cause of
action did not depend upon the foreign statute in question though his
recovery would have been enhanced if effect had been given to it.'
2
The Court in that case held, in effect, that since the plaintiff's cause
of action was not dependent upon the foreign statute, the Federal
Constitution did not require the forum to give effect to the statute
even if it were not penal.'3 Where the cause.of action is not dependent
upon the full faith and credit clause, the characterization of a foreign
statute is made for the purpose of applying the internal conflict of
laws rule and is a local matter rather than a federal issue.14 In the
instant case, however, the plaintiff's cause of action is itself dependent
upon the enforcement of the foreign statute; two of the three judges
seemed to recognize that the full faith and credit clause required
Tennessee to enforce the Arkansas statute if that statute were not
penal in the international sense. The court, however, refused to
recognize that the rights involved (here the plaintiff's constitutional
right to have his cause of action given effect in Tennessee if the
statute is not penal) may be so dependent upon federal authority
(Constitution or statute) that federal law should determine the
outcome.'3
The policy of the Erie case was to discourage forum-shopping
between the state courts and the federal courts within a given state.
10. Higginbotham v. Baton Rouge, 306 U.S. 535, 59 Sup Ct. 705, 83 L. Ed. 968
(1939).
11. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 Sup. Ct. 1020, 85
L. Ed. 1477 (1941).
12. Id. at 498.
13. Ibid.
14. See Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 55 Sup. Ct. 589, 79 L. Ed. 1100
(1935); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 32 Sup. Ct. 415, 56 L. Ed. 749
(1912); Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 224, 36 L. Ed. 1123
(1892). These cases imply that if the cause of action is not within the scope
of the full faith and credit clause, the characterization of the foreign statute
is a matter of the local conflict of laws rule.
15. See BUNN, JURISDIcTION AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED
STATES 268-76 (5th ed. 1949).
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Since the question of characterization in the instant case is properly
a federal issue, the Erie decision should not be controlling. Moreover,
had the federal court of appeals declined to follow the Tennessee
characterization, the result would not have been repugnant to the
policy underlying the Erie case. The uniformity of decision therein
contemplated would have ensued for the reason that state courts
must follow federal determinations of federal issues.
LABOR LAW-UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE-INTENT TO
ENCOURAGE OR DISCOURAGE UNION MEMBERSHIP
BY DISCRIMINATION
The National Labor Relations Board petitioned for enforcement
of cease-and-desist and back pay orders in three cases which were
combined in the United States Supreme Court. In each case, the
Board found that a labor union had caused an employer to violate
Section 8 (a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act by discriminat-
ing to encourage membership in a labor organization.' Involved were
a refusal to hire,2 discrimination in job assignments because of a
reduction of seniority rights by the union3 and retroactive wage
payments only to members of a closed union.4 Held, enforcement
granted in each case. An intention to encourage or discourage union
membership may be presumed by the Board from the nature of
the discrimination. Radio Officers' Union of Commercial Telegraphers
Union, AFL v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 74 Sup. Ct. 323 (1954).
Subject to a proviso relating to union security contracts, Section
8 (a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act makes it an unfair
'labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire
or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
.. "5 There are three prerequisites to a violation of the section. First,
the employer must know or have reason to believe that the employee
was engaging in a protected activity.6 Second, there must be an
intention to discriminate because of that activity.7 Finally, the Board
1. See Walsh, Section 8(b)(2) Discrimination, 2 LABOR L.J. 495 (1951);
Foley, Union Unfair Labor Practices under the. Taft-Hartley Act, 33 VA. L.
REv. 697 (1947); Note, Some Unfair Labor Practices under the Taft-Hartley
Act, 5 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 13 (1948).
2. NLRB v. Radio Officers' Union of Commercial Telegraphers Unions,
AFL, 196 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1952), afT'd, instant case.
3. NLRB v. Teamsters Union, 196 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1952), rev'd, instant case.
4. NLRB v. Gaynor News Co., 197 F.2d 719 (2d Cir. 1952), 53 CoL. L. REV.
559 (1953), affd, instant case.
5. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), as amended, 65 STAT. 601 (1951), 29 U.S.C.A. §
158(a) (3) (Supp. 1953).
6. 17 NLRB ANN. REP. 136 (1952).
7. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615, 81
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must find that the effect of the discrimination would be to tend to
encourage or discourage union membership." The burden of proof
is always on the Board to establish a violation,9 though the establish-
ment of a prima facie case shifts the burden of going forward with
the evidence to the employer, who has the burden of establishing
an affirmative defense.10 The Board must base its decision on the
preponderance of the evidence.." Its findings of fact, if supported by
substantial evidence 12 on the record considered as a whole, are
conclusive in a reviewing court.
13
The element of intention required for a violation of Section 8 (a) (3)
does not necessarily involve an employer's attitude toward unions
or unionization; 4 the requirement is satisfied if the natural and
probable consequence of the employer's discrimination is the en-
couragement or discouragement of union membership. Nor must an
intention to encourage or discourage union membership be the sole
reason for the discrimination. It is enough if it is one of several
reasons1 The Board, in determining the employer's intention, has
considered the disparate treatment of union and nonunion employees
and a failure to give a satisfactory explanation therefor, the proximity
of an employee's union activity and the discrimination, a departure
from the employer's usual procedures and his demonstrated attitude
toward unions.'
L. Ed. 893 (1937); NLRB v. Harris-Woodson Co., 162 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1947);
Wells, Inc. v. NLRB, 162 F.2d 457 (9th Cir. 1947); NLRB v. Walt Disney
Productions, 146 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1944); MANOFF, LABOR RELATIONS LAW
82 (1950).
8. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 65 Sup. Ct. 982, 89 L.
Ed. 1372 (1945); NLRB v. Illinois Tool Works, 153 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1946);
NLRB v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 128 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1942). Compare the
instant case, with NLRB v. Air Associates, Inc., 121 F.2d 586 (2d Cir. 1941).
The instant case apparently overrules NLRB v. Del. E. Webb Const. Co., 196
F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1952), and NLRB v. Reliable Newspaper Delivery, Inc.,
187 F.2d 547 (3d Cir. 1951).
9. NLRB v. Reynolds International Pen Co., 162 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1947);
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 107 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1939); Ward, Proof
of "Discrimination" under the National Labor Relations Act, 7 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 797, 809-10 (1939).
10. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, supra note 9.
11. 48 STAT. 926 (1934), as amended, 62 STAT. 991 (1948), 29 U.S.C.A. §
160(c) (Supp. 1953).
12. See NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 299,
59 Sup. Ct. 501, 83 L. Ed. 660 (1939).
13. See note 11 supra. See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 71 Sup. Ct. 456, 95 L. Ed. 456 (1951).
14. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 65 Sup. Ct. 982, 89
L. Ed. 1372 (1945).
15. See NLRB v. Industrial Cotton Mills, 208 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1953).
Cusano v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1951); Wells, Inc. v. NLRB, 162 F.2d
457 (9th Cir. 1947); NLRB v. Gluek Brewing Co., 144 F.2d 847 (8th Cir. 1944);
2 TELLER, LABOR DisPUTEs AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING § 306 (1940).
16. Connecticut Chemical Research Corp., 98 N.L.R.B. 160 (1952); Ml1ler
(California Willis), 98 N.L.R.B. 325 (1952); Paramount Textile Machinery Co.,
97 N.L.R.B. 691 (1951); Wood Mfg. Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 633 (1951); Nina Dye
Works Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 824 (1951); 17 NLRB ANN. REP. 135 (1952).
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After incantation of the maxim that a man is assumed to intend
the foreseeable consequences of his conduct,17 the Court held in
the instant case that the Board may presume an employer's intention
if his conduct, alone or in conjunction with the surrounding cir-
cumstances, leads the Board, in its expert judgment, to believe that
encouragement or discouragement of union membership could reason-
ably have been foreseen. Thus, the test of the employer's intention
becomes the Board's determination of the foreseeability of the effect
of the discrimination. Certain types of discriminatory conduct, e.g.,
disparate wage treatment, 8 discharge for union activity,19 inter-
ference in jurisdictional disputes in favor of one union,20 enforce-
ment of nonsolicitation rules21 and discrimination at the instance of
a labor union without a valid union-security contract (as in the
instant case), may be considered violations per se22 of Section 8 (a) (3)
since it may be inferred that they inherently encourage or discourage
union membership. In such a case, the Board may presume the
intention merely from the act itself. In other cases, the presumption
may be raised by a consideration of the act in the context of the
circumstances surrounding it.
This presumption apparently may be rebutted by showing that
under -the circumstances encouragement or discouragement would
not tend to result from the discrimination and therefore could not
reasonably have been anticipated. The presumption, if conclusive,
would make the employer's intention irrelevant,23 and both the Board
and the courts have recognized its relevance.24 The Court did not go
so far in the instant case, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out in
a concurring opinion.2 5
The legal principle herein enunciated by the Court for determining
an employer's intention in discrimination cases sheds light on a
17. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 31, 65 Sup. Ct. 918, 89 L. Ed. 1441
(1945); 2 WIGmOPE, EVIDENCE § 300 (3d ed. 1940).
18. Instant case, 74 Sup. Ct. at 341.
19. NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206, 60 Sup. Ct. 493, 84 L. Ed.
704 (1940); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 57 Sup. Ct. 650, 81 L. Ed.
953 (1937); NLRB v. Industrial Cotton Mills, 208 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1953);
NLRB v. J. I. Case Co., Bettendorf Works, 198 F.2d 919 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 917 (1952).
20. NLRB v. Gluek Brewing Co., 144 F.2d 847 (8th Cir. 1944); NLRB v.
Hudson Motor Car Co., 128 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1942).
21. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 65 Sup. Ct. 982, 89
L. Ed. 1372 (1945); NLRB v. Illinois Tool Works, 153 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1946).
22. FonxoscH, A TREATISE ON LABOR LAW 750 (1953).
23. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2492 (3d ed. 1940).
24. NLRB v. Harris-Woodson Co., 162 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1947); NLRB v.
Reynolds International Pen Co., 162 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1947); NLRB v. Draper
Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944); 18 NLRB ANN. REP. 38 (1953); 17 NLRB
ANN. REP. 109 (1952). See MANOFF, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 82 (1950); Green,
Evidence of Unfair Labor Practices under the Taft-Hartley Act, 26 N.C.L.
REV. 253 (1948).
25. Instant case, 74 Sup. Ct. at 343-44.
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heretofore shadowed concept. Hereafter, courts will not have to labor
to find a ground for sustaining the Board's findings. 26 Though the
result of the case will probably be to make it more difficult for an
employer to defend successfully a discrimination charge on the
ground of a lack of intent, that defense is still open. This would
not have been true had the Board's contention that the employer's
intention is irrevelant prevailed in the instant case.
26. NLRB v. Industrial Cotton Mills, 208 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1953); Cusano v.
NLRB, 190 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1951); Allis-Chalmers 1Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 162
F.2d 435 (7th Cir. 1947); NLRB v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 128 F.2d 528 (6th Cir.
1942).
